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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
XT i 
V • i 
ROBERT RAY HULSE, l 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
t Case No. 880579-CA 
i Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from defendant's conviction for 
Theft, a third degree felony, in the Third Judicial District 
Court. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp. 
1988) which permits criminal appeals from the district court for 
crimes other than capital and first degree felonies. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence produced at trial regarding 
the identity and value of the stolen property was sufficient to 
allow reasonable jurors to find defendant guilty of third degree 
felony theft. 
2. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion 
in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 
3. Whether the value of the watches taken supports a 
conviction for third degree felony theft. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSg STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
Utah Code Amu S 76-6-404 (1978) 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412 (1978) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 25, 1988, defendant was charged with theft, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1978), for an incident which occurred on May 20, 1988 (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 13-14). A jury trial was held on July 28, 
1988, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.' After trial, the jury 
found defendant guilty as charged (R. at 65). 
Defendant's motion for a new trial followed on 
September 20, 1988 (R. at 69-70), and received consideration at 
the time of the sentencing hearing on September 23, 1988 (R. at 
88; Transcript of Proceeding [hereinafter T.] at 133-134). After 
considering the matter, Judge Sawaya dismissed defendant's motion 
(R. at 134), and sentenced him to serve a term in the Utah State 
Prison, not to exceed five years (R. at 72), 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 20, 1988, defendant entered a jewelry store, 
(known as The Time Shop Jewelers,) located at 15 West South 
Temple in downtown Salt Lake City (T. at 48-49). Jeff Hansen, a 
store salesman, greeted defendant and asked if he would like to 
see the watch that defendant had shown interest in when he 
visited the store the day before (T. at 45, 49). Defendant 
responded "yes" and asked to look at another watch at the same 
time. Mr. Hansen removed the watches from the showcase and 
placed them on top of the case for defendant's perusal. In a 
customary fashion, defendant took a man's black analog digital 
Seiko watch and tried it on. He then grabbed the second watch, a 
gold Seiko, and bolted at full speed for and out the store door 
(T. at 51/ 63). Mr. Hansen, seeing defendant fleeing with the 
two items of store property, quickly jumped over the counter and 
ran out the door in pursuit of defendant (T. at 52). 
Defendant leaped into his waiting car on the driver's 
side and prepared to drive off, but Hansen dove through the open 
passenger side window and grabbed him (T. at 52, 75). John 
Logsdon, another salesman, saw defendant's dash for the door and 
the subsequent pursuit by Mr. Hansen and quickly followed the two 
out the store door and also leaned through the open car passenger 
window (T. at 75-76). A struggle involving the three men 
commenced and then ended when the car was driven into a concrete 
pillar (T. at 53, 66, 76). 
The salesmen and two bystanders physically restrained 
defendant through his repeated attempts to flee the scene until 
the arrival of the police which happened shortly thereafter (T. 
at 55). Lieutenant Norm Thompson of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department arrived at the scene and took the black analog digital 
Seiko watch from defendant's wrist. This watch, valued at $220-
$275, still had the store's tag attached (T. at 51, 90, 95-96). 
Lieutenant Thompson testified to taking the black watch from the 
wrist of the defendant and placing it in the custody of Detective 
Bruce Smith. Detective Smith testified to placing the watch into 
evidence on May 20 and retrieving it from the evidence room on 
the day of the trial prior to turning it over to the prosecutor 
for presentation at trial (T. at 99-100). 
The second watch, a gold Seiko valued at $185-$225 and 
damaged in the fracas, was picked up by John Logsdon from inside 
the defendant's car after the crash, and subsequently placed on 
top of the store's safe where it remained until the time of trial 
(T. at 51, 77, 90, 95-96). The gold watch came into evidence 
without objection from defendant (T. at 80). 
After the guilty verdict had been entered, but before 
sentencing, defendant made a motion for a new trial based on an 
affidavit of an alleged witness to defendant's arrest (T. at 
133). The newly found witness allegedly would testify that "he 
had witnessed the watch—the two watches being recovered from the 
street near the vehicle rather than . . . one from his 
[defendant's] wrist and one from the floor of the car" (T. at 
133). The motion was denied (T. at 134). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to establish that the evidence in this 
case is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable minds could 
not have found the him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
testimony of the witness to the taking of the watches was 
sufficient to establish defendant's guilt even if the watches had 
not been retrieved and introduced at trial. 
The issue of whether the watches introduced into 
evidence were the same watches retrieved from defendant and his 
car depends to a certain extent on the chain of custody for the 
watches after they were seized from defendant. A proper chain of 
custody was established for the black watch at trial and has a 
presumption of regularity under Utah law. Defendant did not 
rebut that presumption by presenting evidence, or even a claim, 
that the exhibits had been subject to bad faith, altering, or 
tampering. Defendant did not challenge the introduction of the 
gold watch at trial so cannot now object to its admission. 
Defendant also fails to establish grounds sufficient to 
grant a new trial. The trial court is allowed great deference in 
making determinations regarding the granting of new trials based 
on a contention of "new evidence." Defendant's claim to new 
evidence lacks the substance and credibility which would be 
necessary to justify this Court's overturning the trial court's 
finding that the "new evidence" would probably not have changed 
the verdict. 
The State adequately proved its case to allow a jury to 
find the defendant guilty of stealing two watches valued at 
between $250 and $1,000 to classify the theft as a third degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Defendant correctly points out that the standard of 
review for an insufficiency of the evidence claim is well 
established. A verdict will be overturned only when the evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable persons could not 
have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1987), quoting State v. 
Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted); see 
also State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), superseded by 
statute/rule in the context of bench trials, as stated in State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 
1029 (Utah App. 1987). 
The burden of establishing that "the evidence was so 
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime charged" rests upon the defendant. State v. Kerekes, 622 
P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). In the instant case, defendant 
fails to carry this burden. 
A. THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY FROM HANSEN 
THAT DEFENDANT TOOK THE WATCHES FROM THE STORE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT WHETHER 
THE WATCHES INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WERE THE SAME 
WATCHES TAKEN BY DEFENDANT OR NOT. 
Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the 
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that the 
watches introduced as exhibits were the watches taken by 
defendant from the jewelry store. The State maintains first that 
that question is immaterial based on the overwhelming evidence 
that defendant committed the theft. Defendant was seen by Hansen 
putting the black watch on his wrist then grabbing the gold watch 
and running from the store (T. at 51-52, 61). Even had defendant 
been able to dispose of the watches and they had never been 
recovered for introduction at trial, the testimony of Hansen was 
sufficient to support the jury's conviction of defendant. That 
the watches were recovered and in the manner and location that 
they were, only bolstered Hansen's testimony. 
B. BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF RETRIEVAL, CHAIN OF 
CUSTODY, AND IDENTIFICATION BY APPEARANCE OF THE 
WATCHES, THEIR ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE WAS PROPER. 
Defendant argues that the watches introduced into 
evidence were not conclusively proven to be the same watches he 
took from the store and, without that conclusiveness, the State 
did not prove its case that defendant stole the watches. As 
noted above in Point I A, the evidence of defendant's asportation 
was conclusively proven even had the watches not been recovered. 
Their introduction into evidence was proper because the issues 
raised by defendant as to their identification go to the weight 
to be given the exhibits, not their admissibility. 
Defendant, on appeal, focuses on whether the black 
analog digital Seiko watch entered as evidence at trial was the 
same watch stolen from The Time Shop Jewelers and recovered from 
defendant's wrist, and not whether defendant had in fact taken a 
black analog digital watch from the shop (Brief of defendant at 
7-9). At trial, the State introduced abundant testimony to 
support the inference that the watch taken from The Time Shop and 
recovered from defendant's wrist was the same watch stolen by 
defendant and the same watch admitted at trial. Jeff Hansen, 
when asked to identify Exhibit 1, testified, "this is the watch 
that he [defendant] asked to look atM on May 19, and the same 
watch Mr. Hansen showed to defendant the following day and which 
defendant took from the store. (T. at 45, 48-49). The store 
owner, Mr. Howard Logsdon, testified that he had had in stock a 
watch identical to Exhibit 1 before the theft, but did not have 
it immediately after the theft, and believed Exhibit 1 was the 
missing watch (T. at 91). Lieutenant Norm Thompson testified 
that Exhibit 1 appeared to be the watch he took from the 
defendant's wrist after the theft, and which he gave to Detective 
Smith to be placed in the police evidence locker (T. at 95). 
Detective Bruce Smith testified that he had placed the watch in 
an evidence envelope and that the envelope containing Exhibit 1 
was the same envelope (T. at 99). 
Defendant's appeal thus addresses a chain of custody 
issue regarding the black Seiko watch. In Utah law, a 
presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by police 
and other public officials exists. An exhibit will be excluded 
only if affirmative evidence exists and is presented to establish 
bad faith, or actual tampering or altering of the evidence in the 
chain of custody. State v. Eagle Bookf Inc., 583 P.2d 73, 75 
(Utah 1978), citing United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1306 
(9th Cir. 1977); see also State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). Any gaps or 
weaknesses in the chain of custody go to the weight given the 
evidence by the trier of fact and not to the admissibility of the 
exhibits. Eagle Book 583 P.2d at 75. 
Defendant does not allege bad faith, tampering with or 
altering of the evidence which was in police custody. He appears 
to be arguing that the Court must assume that the watch placed 
into evidence by the police officers was not the same watch as 
the one introduced at trial because no one testified as to 
comparing serial numbers and thus could not say that the numbers 
showed that it was the same watch. That argument flies in the 
face of the traditional chain of custody law and should be 
rejected. The officers established that the watch introduced at 
trial was in their custody from the time it was taken from 
defendant's wrist until it was delivered to the prosecutor at 
trial. Unless defendant presented evidence to rebut the 
presumption of regularity in the police custody of the exhibit, 
the jury was entitled to infer that Exhibit 1 was the watch taken 
from defendant's person. 
As to the gold watch which defendant seized and carried 
from the store and which John Logsdon retrieved from the floor of 
defendant's car after defendant's capture, no objection was made 
to its introduction at trial. Defendant is now precluded from 
objecting to the admission of Exhibit 5, the gold watch, because 
he has failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Rule 103(a) Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Even if the issue had been preserved, again 
the question is the weight to be given the evidence, not its 
admissibility. The testimony at trial was that defendant picked 
up the gold watch (Exhibit 5) and ran out of the store and into 
his car. Mr. Hansen was in hot pursuit with Mr. John Logsdon 
close behind. After the brief scuffle in the car, which 
concluded with the detention and arrest of defendant, John 
Logsdon found the gold watch on the floor of defendant's 
automobile and put it in his pocket (T. at 77). The watch, at 
that point, had been dented and scratched and the crystal broken 
(T. at 50). John Logsdon recalled that the watch was in his 
pocket two-and-a-half hours later and took it from his pocket, 
placed it on top of the store safe then took it to the trial (T. 
at 77-78). Both watches still had the store's stickers on them. 
(T. at 77 and 96). From these facts, the jury could reasonably 
infer that Exhibit 5 was the gold watch which defendant had taken 
from the store and that it haa oeen damaged in the struggle 
between defendant and the salesmen. 
POINT II 
JUDGE SAWAYA EXERCISED PROPER DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Utah courts have stated on many occasions, "[i]t is a 
matter solely within the discretion of the trial court as to 
whether it should grant a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence." State v. Harris 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d 
438, 439 (Utah 1973). The determination to deny a motion for a 
new trial based on a newly discovered evidence claim "will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); citing State v. Lesley, 
672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). Evaluation of the trial court's 
discretion will only occur in "instances where there is a grave 
suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because of the 
lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new evidence 
will supply." Harris, 513 P.2d at 439-440. 
The material presented by defendant after trial does 
not qualify as "new evidence," because it is not evidence that 
could not with "reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at trial nor would they [the facts] be such as to render 
a different result probable on retrial of the case." Harris, 513 
P.2d at 440. The new evidence alleged by defendant consists of a 
supposedly eyewitness account that would contest the location of 
the recovery of the two watches. The defendant had ample time 
between the time of the incident and the time of trial to find 
witnesses in an attempt to establish his case. 
The facts surrounding the discovery and allegations of 
the witness who would testify to observing the arrest of 
defendant provide adequate grounds for the trial judge to 
determine that the "new evidence" would not have enlightened the 
jury. The Court was also correct in finding that this affidavit 
did not provide evidence which would have negated evidence 
presented at trial so as to not allow reasonable jurors to find 
the defendant guilty as charged. The new witness, found by the 
defendant while the two men were incarcerated together, allegedly 
would testify that "he had witnessed the watch—the two watches 
being recovered from the street near the vehicle rather than . . 
. one from his wrist and one from the floor of the carM (T. at 
133). In effect, this new testimony would run counter to the 
testimony of the two police officers and the two salesmen. It is 
also conceivable that other witnesses could have been called by 
the prosecution to support the testimony of the policemen and the 
salesmen. Other potential witnesses were the paramedics and the 
pedestrians who helped apprehend defendant who could have been 
called as witnesses to establish the location of the recovery of 
the watches. 
Had a new trial been granted, the "marvelous 
coincidence" (T. at 134) of the appearance of this witness would 
have strained the credulity of reasonable persons called as the 
jury. This new "witness" was in jail and possibly the 
prosecution could have challenged his credibility by establishing 
prior convictions for him. The length of time between the 
arrest, May 20, and the meeting of defendant and the "witness", 
approximately September 20, supports a strong suspicion that this 
observation of the arrest was a fabrication. The trial court's 
decision that this newly discovered evidence would not have 
changed the verdict (T. at 134) was not an abuse of discretion. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL ESTABLISHED 
THE VALUE OF THE TWO WATCHES TAKEN 
SUFFICIENTLY TO SUPPORT A FELONY CONVICTION. 
Defendant's final contention is that the value of the 
watches did not support a third degree felony conviction. This 
is based on his argument that this Court should find that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction of 
theft for one or the other of the watches, if not both. The 
uncontroverted evidence is that the watches were stolen from a 
retail establishment and that the retailer offered them for sale 
at $220 and $180, at the very minimum. Exhibit 1 was for sale at 
$275 but the store owner testified that he would have allowed it 
to be sold for $220, but no less. Exhibit 5 was marked at $225 
but could be sold for no less than $180 (T. at 89-90). Clearly, 
the two watches together were valued at $400 total, at a minimum. 
Defendant's contention is that this Court should find 
insufficient evidence exists to support theft of at least one of 
the watches. If this Court were to so find, then the value of 
whichever watch remained would be less than $250; however, as 
noted above in Point I, the evidence is sufficient to support the 
conviction of theft for both of the watches. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has failed to establish that the evidence 
in this case is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable 
minds could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and has also failed to establish grounds sufficient to grant a 
new trial. Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict for 
conviction, and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _^D^ day of March, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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